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Mackey v. Lanier Collections Agency & Serv., Inc.:
The Supreme Court Diminishes ERISA Preemption
Protection for Welfare Benefit Plans
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA") provides a comprehensive legal structure for the establishment and administration of both pension and welfare benefit plans. 1 Section 514(a) of
ERISA mandates federal preemption of all state actions which would
interfere with either of these types of plans. 2 In Mackey v. Lanier Collections Agency & Serv., Inc., 3 the United States Supreme Court unanimously held that ERISA preempted a Georgia law prohibiting the
garnishment of employee welfare benefits.• However, by a majority of
five justices to four, 5 the Court upheld the use of Georgia's general
garnishment statute 6 as a means by which creditors may garnish contri1. As defined in ERISA section 3(1):
The terms "employee welfare benefit plan" and "welfare plan" mean any plan, fund,
or program which [has been] established or maintained by an employer or by an employee organization, or by both, to the extent that such plan, fund, or program was
established or is maintained for the purpose of providing for its participants or their
beneficiaries, through the purchase of insurance or otherwise ... medical, surgical, or
hospital care or benefits, or benefits in the event of sickness, accident, disability, death
or unemployment, or vacation benefits, apprenticeship or other training programs, or
day care centers, scholarship funds, or prepaid legal services ..
29 U.S.C. § 1002(1 )( 1982).
2. ERISA section 514(a) states in pertinent part: "[t]he provisions of this title [Title
!-Protection of Employee Benefit Rights] ... shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as
they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan [which is covered by ERISA]." 29
U.S.C. § 1144(a)(1982).
3. 108 S. Ct. 2182 (1988).
4. /d. at 2185 citing GA. ConE ANN. § 18-4-22.1 (1982) which provides, in relevant part:
Funds or benefits of a pension, retirement, or employee benefit plan or program subject
to the provisions of the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as
amended, shall not be subject to the process of garnishment ... unless such garnishment is based upon a judgment for alimony or for child support .
/d.
5. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices Brennan, Marshall and Stevens joined. Justice Kennedy filed a dissenting opinion m
which Justices Blackmun, O'Connor and Scalia joined. Mackey, 108 S. Ct. at 2184.
6. GA. Com: ANN. § 18-4-20(c)(1982) provides in relevant part:
All property, money, or effects of the defendant in the possession or control of the
garnishee at the time of service of the summons of garnishment upon the garnishee to
the date of the garnishee's answer shall be subject to process of garnishment except, in
the case of collateral securities in the hands of a creditor, such securities shall not be
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butions made to a welfare benefit plan by plan participants. 7
This note first evaluates an apparent inconsistency presented by
the Mackey decision between judicial interpretation of the language of
ERISA's section 514(a) and congressional intent concerning that section. It then discusses the decision's foreseeable effect on welfare benefit
plans and proposes a possible solution to provide equal preemptive protection to both pensions and welfare benefits.

II.
A.

THE

Mackey

CASE

Background

In 197 4, Congress enacted ERISA after " 'almost a decade of
studying the Nation's private pension plans' and other employee benefit
plans." 8 Through that long deliberation, "Congress found that there
had been a 'rapid and substantial' growth in the 'size, scope and numbers' of employee benefit plans and that 'the continued well-being and
security of millions of employees and their dependents are directly affected by these plans.' " 9 Overall, ERISA has three major purposes: 1)
"assuring the equitable character of [employee benefit] plans," 2) assuring the "financial soundness [of employee benefit plans]" and 3) fostering and protecting the growth of such plans. 10 ERISA controls two
types of employee benefit plans: (1) pension benefit plans which provide retirement income 11 and (2) welfare benefit plans which provide
health, legal, vacation or training benefits. 12 ERISA preempts state
laws relating to either of these two types of benefit plans. Section 514
of ERISA states that the Act "supersede[s] any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any [qualified] employee
benefit plan." 13
The preemptive power of ERISA's section 514 is very broad. 14
subject to garnishment so long as there is an amount owed on the debt for which the
securities were given as collateral.

/d.
7. Mackey, 108 S. Ct. at 2191.
8. Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Central Transport, Inc.,
472 U.S. 559, 569 (1985)(quoting Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 446 U.S.
359, 361 (1980)).
9. ld.
10. Kilberg & Herron, The Preemption of State Law Under ERISA, 1979 DuKE L.J. 383,
386 (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ IOOI(a) and 1144 (1976) and statements of Congressman Ullman and
Senator Javits (120 CoNe. REc. 29198 and 29942 (1974))).
II. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(1982).
12. Jd.
13. 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (1982).
14. A narrow preemption provision was originally proposed and rejected. A sponsor of the
bill, Representative Dent, noted that "to many the crowning achievement of this legislation [is] the
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Section 514 plays a critical role in the fulfillment of ERISA's purpose
of fostering and protecting the growth of private employee pension and
welfare plans. 15 By preempting state laws which deal with employee
benefits, section 514 relieves plan administrators and multi-state employers of the burden of keeping abreast of, and complying with, a
wide variety of state laws. 16 The relative convenience of uniform federal regulation which preemption provides encourages the growth of
employee benefit plans. 17
In the landmark case of Franchise Tax Bd. of California v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust for Southern California 18 ("FTB
II"), the Supreme Court examined the scope of ERISA's preemption
provision as it relates to the preemption of state laws affecting employee welfare benefit plans. In FTB II, the Court held that a state's
tax claim against a welfare benefit trust was not removable to federal
court on the basis of the question of whether section 514(a) of ERISA
preempted the state's power to levy on funds held in trust. 19 Thus, the
case was vacated and remanded leaving the substantive question unresolved. Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have reinforced and
broadened the strength and reach of preemption with regard to welfare
benefit plans, 20 but the scope of federal preemption of state laws affecting employee welfare benefit plans, the substantive issue of FTB II, has
remained unsettled. In Mackey, the Court has addressed the issue of
federal preemption in this context.

B.

The Facts of the Case

The South Atlantic ILA/Employers Vacation and Holiday Fund
("Fund") provides vacation and holiday benefits to longshoremen in
several southeastern states 21 and is an "employee welfare benefit plan"
reservation to Federal authority the sole authority to regulate the field of employee benefit plans.
With the preemption of the field, we round out the protection afforded participants by eliminating
the threat of conflicting and inconsistent State and local regulation." 120 CoNG REc. 29197
(1974).
15. Kilberg and Herron, supra note 10, at 388.
16. !d.
17. /d.
18. 463 U.S. 1 (1983).
19. /d.
20. See, e.g., Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 107 S. Ct. 1549 (1987)(a law "relates to" an
ERISA regulated plan "if it has a connection with or reference to [an employee benefit] plan.");
Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983)(to "affect" ERISA plans, a law need only
"relate to" plans and need not be designed to affect a plan).
21. The employers are located in North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia and Florida.
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 2 n.1, Mackey v. Lanier
Collections Agency & Service, Inc. 108 S. Ct. 2182 (1988).

432

B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 3

as defined by ERISA. 22 Mackey and the other petitioners are trustees
of the Fund. 23 Lanier Collections Agency & Service, Inc. ("Lanier") is
a collection agency which sought and obtained money judgments
against twenty-three plan participants who owed money to Lanier's clients.24 Lanier instituted an action in a Georgia trial court seeking to
garnish the participants' plan benefits. The trial court granted the garnishment request. 211 The Georgia Court of Appeals reversed, 26 holding
that a Georgia statute exempted plan benefits from garnishment. 27
The Georgia Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, 28 holding that the Georgia law prohibiting garnishment of employee welfare
benefits was preempted by ERISA because it conflicted with the federal
scheme. 29 In the U.S. Supreme Court, the trustees of the Fund challenged Georgia's general garnishment statute on preemption grounds
pursuant to ERISA section 514(a) as well as defending the anti-garnishment statute from preemption.

C.

The Majority Reasoning of the Supreme Court

By simply adhering to strong precedent, the Court found no difficulty in unanimously striking down the Georgia statute which gave
special protection to ERISA plans. The preemption of the general garnishment statute proved to be a more divisive issue and the applicability
of that statute was upheld by a five to four majority. 30 The majority
upheld the garnishment of ERISA plans as consistent with ERISA section 502. Furthermore, the majority contended that its narrow interpretation of section 514(a) was more consistent with congressional intent
than a broad reading of the statute.
22. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(1) and 1003 (1982).
23. The board of trustees is composed of twelve members, six are appointed by employers
and six are appointed by the union. The Fund:
is a type of forced savings plan, or spendthrift trust, designed to insure that the employee participants do not dissipate the vacation benefits they are eligible to receive
through the Fund until they actually receive each year's lump sum payment. To that
end, the Trust Agreement expressly provides that the "Fund shall not be liable for or
subject to the debts, contracts or liabilities of the ... employees [or] beneficiaries."
Brief for the United States at 3 n.2, Mackey, 108 S. Ct 2182 (quoting Trust Agreement at 17).
24. Mackey, 108 S. Ct. at 2184.
25. !d.
26. !d.
27. !d. (citing GA. Com: ANN. § 18-4-22.1 (1982)).
28. Mackey v. Lanier Collections Agency & Service, Inc., 256 Ga. 499, 350 S.E.2d 439
(1986).
29. Mackey, 108 S. Ct. at 2184.
30. See supra note 5.
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Georgia's anti-garnishment statute

The Supreme Court's decision reinforced ERISA's preemption
power in cases where the state statute makes direct reference to
ERISA. The Court's unanimous decision on this issue reiterated its interpretation of section 514(a)'s language which provides for the preemption of state statutes which "relate to" employee benefit plans. The
Court relied on two recent cases: Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 31 and

Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux. 32
In Shaw, the Court held that the ERISA preemption provision,
section 514, preempted state laws which "affected" employee benefits
because such laws "relate to" ERISA. They also held that a law affecting employee benefits is preempted even if the law was not specifically
designed to affect employee benefits. 33 Pilot Life reaffirmed that a state
law which "related to" an employee benefit plan was preempted by
ERISA "if it has a connection with or reference to such a plan." 34
Thus, the Georgia statute prohibiting the garnishment of ERISA plans
could have been preempted due to either its having an "affect" on
ERISA plans or its "reference to" ERISA plans by mentioning them
with particularity. 35

2.

Georgia's general garnishment statute

Although the Court unanimously found preemption of Georgia's
law regarding the prohibition of garnishing welfare benefits, the Court
held that the Georgia general garnishment statute was not preempted
by ERISA. The Court conceded that "ERISA itself offers no express
answer as to whether welfare benefit plan trustees must comply with
garnishment orders." 36 Because ERISA does not explicitly address this
issue, the Court sought to determine congressional intent via an examination of two aspects of the Act. The Court examined both the subjection of ERISA benefit plans to lawsuits for the garnishment of beneficiaries' funds and the supposed redundancy of section 206(d)(1), given
31. 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
32. 481 u.s. 41 (1987).
33. "To interpret [section] 514(a) to preempt only state laws specifically designed to affect
employee benefit plans would be to ignore the remainder of [section] 514." Shaw, 463 U.S. at 98.
34. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 47 (1987)(quoting Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 739 (1985)).
35. The Court also noted that the state law would be preempted even if it "was enacted by
the Georgia legislature to help effectuate ERISA's underlying purposes" as "[t]he pre-emption
provision [of section 514(a)] ... displace[s] all state laws that fall within its sphere, even including
state laws that are consistent with ERISA's substantive requirements." Mackey, 108 S. Ct. at
2185 (citing Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 739 (1985)).
36. Mackey, 108 S. Ct. at 2186.
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a broad interpretation of section 514(a).
The Court noted that Congress intended to subject ERISA benefit
plans to suit under certain circumstances. Section 502(d)( 1) provides
that "[a]n employee benefit plan may sue or be sued ... " 37 by particular persons who seek specific relief, including the recovery of plan benefits.38 Plans can also be sued "for run-of-the-mill state-law claims
such as unpaid rent, failure to pay creditors, or even torts committed by
an ERISA plan." 39 Since plans can be sued, it should follow that there
must be a way of collecting the judgments, but ERISA provides no
enforcement mechanism. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 69(a) defers
to state law to provide methods for collecting judgments. Therefore,
state-law methods of enforcing judgments, including garnishment, must
remain undisturbed. The majority concluded that section 514 provides
no distinction between a plan and its participants in terms of their
amenability to state-law attachment proceedings.
The majority contended that preemption of the Georgia general
garnishment statute by section 514(a) would render section 206(d)(l)
redundant. Section 206(d)( 1) expressly requires all pension plans to
"provide that benefits provided under the plan not be assigned or alienated."40 Therefore, the Court reasoned, "[i]f we were to give ERISA
[section] 514(a) the meaning which petitioners and the Solicitor General attribute to it-barring garnishment of all ERISA plan benefits-we would render [section] 206(d)(1) substantially redundant with
[section] 514(a)." 41 The Court implied that if Congress had intended
welfare benefits to be protected from garnishment, it would have passed
such a law.
The Court chose to disregard the obvious redundancy which arises
in a comparison of their narrow, non-preempting interpretation of section 514(a) and a plain reading of section 514(b )(7). Section 514(b )(7)
was added through the Retirement Equity Act ("REA"). 42 In 1984, the
REA amended ERISA to permit the garnishment of both pensions and
welfare benefits to satisfy a qualified domestic relations order. 43 The
REA amendment indicates that Congress considered section 514 as
37. !d. at 2187 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (1982)).
38. !d. at 2186-87.
39. !d. at 2187.
40. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1)(1982).
41. Mackey, I 08 S. Ct. at 2189.
42. Codified at 29 U.S.C § 1144(b)(7)(Supp. II 1984).
43. Qualified domestic relations orders are those judgments, orders and decrees which "relate
to the provision of child support, alimony payments, or marital property rights to a spouse, former
spouse, child, or other dependent of a participant, and is made pursuant to a Stale domestic relations law," which is specific regarding the amount and number of payments to be made and which
do not increase the plan's obligation to the participant. !d.
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originally written in 1974 to prohibit the garnishment of employee welfare benefit plans. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held that the intent
of the amending Congress is immaterial in determining the meaning of
section 514(a) because "[i]t is the intent of the Congress that enacted
[the section] that controls.""" Because the 197 4 Congress enacted section 514(a), not the 1984 Congress, the Court determined that the legislative history of the REA was irrelevant.

III.

ANALYSIS

Section 514(a) should preempt the Georgia general garnishment
statute because that statute "relates to" ERISA. However, the Supreme
Court held that section 514(a) did not preempt Georgia's general garnishment statute by: 1) mistakenly equating plans with plan participants' contributions for the purpose of applying ERISA section 502;
and 2) improperly appraising congressional intent, by ignoring clear
manifestations of recent congressional intent and, instead, relying on a
plausible, but not indisputable, interpretation of the intent of the Congress which enacted the original ERISA legislation. As a result, even
the broad intent of ERISA as originally envisioned when passed by the
197 4 Congress has been thwarted by the Mackey decision.

A.

The Applicability of Section 514(a)

Section 514(a) applies to the general garnishment law because it
indisputably "relates to" the plans themselves. By its terms, ERISA
section 514(a) only preempts state laws that "relate to" employee benefit plans. Justice Kennedy, dissenting in Mackey, stated that "state garnishment laws necessarily relate to employee benefit plans to the extent
they require such plans to act as garnishees, which is a substantial and
onerous obligation." 411 In the majority opinion, Justice White identified
44. Mackey, 108 S. Ct. at 2191 (quoting Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 354 n.39
(1977)).
45. !d. at 2192 (Kennedy, J, dissenting).
Justice Kennedy enumerated the additional administrative costs inherent in garnishment:
[The plan trustees] are required to confirm the identity of each of the 23 plan participants who owe money to [the collection agency], calculate the participant's maximum
entitlement from the fund for the period between the service date and the reply date of
the summons of garnishment, determine the amount that each participant owes to the
[collection agency], and make payments into state court of the lesser of the amount
owed to [the collection agency] and the participant's entitlement. [The trustees] must
also make decisions concerning the validity and priority of garnishments and, if necessary, bear the costs of litigating these issues. Further, as trustees of a multi-employer
plan covering participants in several States, petitioners are potentially subject to multiple garnishment orders under varying or conflicting state laws.

!d.
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a cost affecting employee benefit plans due to an obligation to garnish-the legal burden of representing the beneficiary-debtor. 46 A conclusion that garnishment laws which impose such administrative costs
"relate to" employee welfare benefit plans is not surprising, given the
common sense standard that has been established for the determination
of whether a law "relates to" ERISA. 47 Furthermore, the burden of
administering the garnishment of employee benefits is likely to be considerably greater for multi-state funds, such as South Atlantic, due to
the differences in garnishment laws among the states. Therefore, Georgia's general garnishment law should be preempted because it "relates
to" the Fund by reason of the burden placed on the Fund.
The five member majority did not touch upon the extent to which
plans will be burdened with these additional costs. This was a serious
oversight. The majority conceded that "plan trustees are served with a
garnishment summons, become parties to a suit, and must respond and
deposit the demanded funds due the beneficiary-debtor-funds that
otherwise they are required to hold and pay out to those beneficiaries."48 The majority, however, did not address the dissent's contention that the Georgia general garnishment law "relates to" ERISA, by
imposing upon employee welfare benefit plans costs which "are not
tenuous, remote or peripheral," 49 thus triggering section 514 as a pertinent statute. To reach its decision, the majority merely relied upon "indicat[ions] that Congress did not intend to forbid the use of state-law
mechanisms of executing judgments against ERISA welfare benefit
plans, even when those mechanisms prevent plan participants from receiving their benefits." 50 However, these indications concern section
502, not section 514.

B.

Logical Inconsistencies tn Mackey

I.

An over-reaching interpretation of section 502

The Court perceived an indication of congressional intent m the
language of ERISA's section 502. The majority noted that section 502
"provides that civil enforcement actions may be brought by particular
persons against ERISA plans, to secure specified relief." 51 From this
46. !d. at 2186.
47. See Shaw, 463 U.S. 85, 96-97 (Both the Human Rights Law prohibiting employers from
discriminating on the basis of pregnancy through an employee benefit plan and the Disability
Benefits Law, requiring employers to pay specific benefits "clearly 'relate to' benefit plans.")
48. Mackey, 108 S. Ct. at 2186.
49. !d. at 2192 (Kennedy, j., dissenting).
50. !d. at 2186 (emphasis added).
51. !d. at 2186-2187 (emphasis added).
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mere statement of fact, the majority inferred congressional intent that
the funds of plan participants are also subject to creditors' claims
through a state's general garnishment laws. However, section 502
merely provides an exception to the rule that plan funds may not be
sued: it does not specifically authorize creditors to reach the funds of
individual fund participants. Such an exception should be narrowly
construed. 112 In Mackey, the exception was inferred to include a right to
reach participants' funds in addition to plan funds and the exception
has begun to swallow the rule.
The Court interpreted the laws concerning the collection of judgments from plans as also pertaining to the individual accounts of the
participants in plans. The Court adopted the logic of the amicus brief
for the respondent that "there is simply no logical way to construe the
English language so that garnishment or attachment laws 'relate to'
benefit plans when they are invoked by creditors of the beneficiaries,
but not when they are invoked by beneficiaries or creditors of the [plan]
itself. " 113 In making this assertion, the amicus brief ignored the language of ERISA section 502 which refers to suing a plan and not a
beneficiary and the mere fact that a plan has been entrusted with an
account does not make that account the plan's money. An analogy can
be drawn which illustrates the difference: if a savings bank can be sued,
it does not logically follow that all of the bank's depositors may be sued
to the full extent of their deposits. Moreover, section 502(d)(2) dictates
that judgments are "enforceable only against the plan as an entity." 114
This language indicates that individual plan participants cannot be
sued because the individuals are not "the plan as an entity."

2.

Congressional intent misinterpreted

Although the Supreme Court did not address the precedent, it has
held that the intent of an amending Congress is entitled to great weight.
In International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel, M the Court held
that the Congress' purpose for enacting ERISA in 197 4 determined the
scope of the coverage of the Securities Act of 1933. In Western Pacific
Railroad Corp. v. Western Pacific Railroad Co., 116 the notes of a revis52. Strict construction is particularly appropriate where the statute in question is in derogation of common-law rules. Checkright Petroleum, Inc. v. Amoco Oil Co., 678 F.2d 5 (2nd Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 833 (1982). Congress intended common law rights and responsibilities to apply to ERISA. Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Central
Transport, Inc., 472 U.S. 559, 569-72 (1985).
53. Mackey, 108 S. Ct. at 2188.
54. 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (1982)(emphasis added)
55. 439 U.S. 551, 569-70 (1979).
56. 345 u.s 247, 255 (1953)
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ing body were "entitled to great weight" in determining Congress' understanding of the statute. 117
When the intent of an amending Congress is not clearly expressed,
however, the intent of the enacting Congress is conclusive. A lack of the
clear expression of an amending Congress' intent is manifested by: 1)
Congress not actually passing a statute; 118 2) the amending Congress not
stating views which concern the section at issue; 119 3) the amending
Congress not clearly stating its views concerning existing law; 60 or 4)
an unmistakable record of the intent of the enacting Congress. 61 The
Mackey Court cited cases exemplifying each of these situations in support of its conclusion that the REA legislative history was not entitled
to any weight. 62
In applying the four preceding propositions to Mackey, the Supreme Court overlooked the facts of the case before it. The legislative
history relevant to Mackey differs significantly from the cases relied
upon by the Court. In the legislative history at issue, Congress passed
an actual amendment to the section in question (section 514(b )(7) )-an
amendment to section 514 of ERISA which is undeniably redundant
under the Court's interpretation of section 514(a). In passing the
amendment, the House Committee Report stated, "[T]he Committee
reasserts that a state tax levy on employee welfare benefit plans is preempted by ERISA (see the holding of the 9th Circuit in Franchise Tax
Board ... )." 63 The House Report also stated that:
57. ld. at 254-55 (citing Ex parte Collett, 337 U.S. 55, 68-71 (1949)).
58. United Air Lines v. McMann, 434 U.S. 192 (1977). The Court chose to disregard mere
legislative observations, unaccompanied by any amendment. Interestingly, Justice Brennan predicted that "[t]he mischief the Court fashion[ed] may be short lived." McMann, 434 U.S. at 458
(Brennan, J., dissenting). His prediction came true when Congress passed legislation which
amended the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 to include retirement plans established before 1967. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2)(1982)(originally enacted as Act of April 6, 1978, §
2(b), 92 Stat. 189).
59. International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977). "The
views of members of a later Congress, concerning different sections of Title VII, enacted after this
litigation was commenced, are entitled to little if any weight. It is the intent of the Congress that
enacted [the original statute], unmistakable in this case, that controls." ld. at 354 n.39 (emphasis
added).
60. United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304 (1960). The legislative history of an amendment
"contain[ed] no clear statement as to Congress' view of then existing law." ld. at 312.
61. Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. at 354 n.39.
62. Mackey, 108 S. Ct. at 2189-91.
63. ld. at 2191. (quoting H.R.Rep. No. 655, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. I at 42 (1984)). It is
particularly interesting that Congress considered the Ninth Circuit's FTB I decision to be the
controlling law in the issue before the Court. ld. The Mackey majority dismissed that decision as
an aberration, stating that "our reading of [section] 514(a) ... is the reading given it by every
other court that has considered the issue in this context (save the Ninth Circuit in a decision that
was vacated by this Court)." Mackey, 108 S. Ct. at 2191.
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the Committee emphasizes that, except as expressly provided, nothing
in the bill is intended to limit or otherwise change the original broad
intent behind ERISA's rule of preemption. That intent has always
been to preempt state or local government laws or actions of any type
which directly or indirectly relate to any employee benefit plan. 64

Thus, actual legislation was passed, the amending Congress stated
views which concerned the same section as that at issue, the intent of
the enacting Congress was unclear and the amending Congress' perception of existing law was clear. However, the Mackey Court chose to
ignore this clear expression of congressional intent. The Court reached
for a way around Congress' clearest and most recent intent and, instead, grasped upon a less likely understanding of the intent of a chronologically more distant Congress. In sum, "[ t ]he Court, which not infrequently calls upon Congress to manifest its intent more clearly,
[disregarded] a clear answer given by Congress in a valid enactment." 65
In a footnote, the Mackey Court made an interesting distinction:
"[T]he suggestion that Congress intentionally adopted, at a single time,
two separate provisions having the same meaning ... calls a particular
statutory interpretation into question." 66 In other words, the Court is
very unsettled by an interpretation of a complex statutory scheme like
ERISA which renders "substantially redundant" 67 one of two simultaneously adopted sections (514(a) and 206(d)(1)). The Court adopted an
interpretation which renders a subsequently enacted piece of legislation
in the same section (section 514(b)(7)) totally redundant to previously
enacted legislation (section 514(a) ). It is more likely that a congressional oversight could result in a partial (or "substantial") redundancy
in distant sections than it is for an oversight to result in a total redundancy within a particular section of legislation. Because sections 514(a)
and 514(b)(7) are in the same section, any redundancy between them is
64. H.R.Rep. No. 655, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1 at 42 (1984)(emphasis added).
65. Mackey, 108 S. Ct. at 2192 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
66. /d. at 2190 n.14.
67. /d. at 2189 (emphasis added). Section 206(d)(1) requires pension plans to "provide that
benefits provided under the plan may not be assigned or alienated." 29 U.S.C. § I 056(d)(l ).
However, if § 514(a) preempted garnishment laws, § 206(d)(l) could still be given effect; it is in a
part of ERISA (Subtitle B. Part 2) that describes the required provisions for pension plans. There
is no comparable part of ERISA that describes required provisions for welfare benefit plans. As a
requirement for the drafting of a plan, § 206(d)(1) could merely be a way of ensuring that plan
participants are given notice of § 514(a)'s prohibition on garnishment. This interpretation of §
206(d)(l) is plausible because a plan participant is considerably more likely to read her pension
plan than ERISA in its entirety, and notice of protection provided under ERISA may be useful to
the plan participants. If § 206(d)(1) is read as not conferring additional protection to pension
plans but, rather, as imposing an obligation on pension plan drafters to provide notice of a protection which is established elsewhere in ERISA (in § 514(a)), any redundant interpretation among
the sections(§§ 206(d)(l), 514(a) and 514(b)(7)) can be completely avoided.
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more incongruous than a redundancy between sections located in different parts of a statute, such as sections 514(a) and 206( d)( 1). This standard for considering redundancy between sections in different parts of a
statute is especially important where the statute is large, complex and
therefore more prone to congressional oversights. Thus, congressional
intent and congressional understanding of the meaning of section
514(a) at the time of the REA should be given effect.
C.

Unanticipated Problems

As noted, no member of the Court suggested that subjecting participants' contributions to garnishment is an insignificant burden on
employee welfare benefit plans. 68 In light of the purpose of ERISA,
such a burden is inconsistent with congressional intent.

1.

Defeat of the fund's purpose

The purpose of a vacation trust fund is to establish a forced savings account for participants which will eventually provide them with
enough money to take a vacation. 69 By permitting garnishment of participants' savings, a major feature of the fund is voided because the
financially undisciplined will not be protected. Taken to its logical conclusion, permitting garnishment also permits assignment; a plan participant could contract for a loan using the vacation trust account as
collateral. Most likely, a plan participant who makes such a contract is
the same individual (one lacking financial discipline) who most needs
the protection of ERISA's preemption. Allowing contractual or de facto
assignment of fund savings by plan participants defeats the purpose of
the fund. The participants could just as easily save individually for
their vacations under such circumstances. Also, a creditor would necessarily charge a premium for loans due to the additional costs of garnishment, thus making individual savings preferable. Another problem
with the Mackey decision is that the trustees could be forced to discriminate against insolvent, or nearly insolvent, plan participants. When a
plan participant defaults on a debt, his creditors garnish the account
and the plan as an entity must bear additional administrative costs.
Trustees could be required to determine which employees are likely to
go into debt and thus incur garnishment. If the trustees do not make
such a determination and terminate the participation of high risk participants, they could be mismanaging the funds of other participants
68. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
69. See supra note 23.
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and could be in breach of their fiduciary duty. 70

2.

Effects beyond vacation trusts

Under ERISA, all employee welfare benefit plans are given equal
protection. Consequently, precedent is now established under Mackey
for the garnishment of all forms of employee welfare benefit plans. For
this reason, it is unfortunate that Mackey involved a vacation trust
fund. It has, quite rightly, been noted that "[i]n real world terms, the
loss of one's pension is far more catastrophic than the loss of funds
devoted to financing an annual vacation."' 1 The same cannot be said of
health benefits, which are another form of employee welfare benefit. It
is hard to imagine a court diminishing important protection of employee welfare benefits in a case where the plan provides vital health
care benefits instead of less critical vacation funds.
Indeed, there are some important and recurring situations in
which a pension is of very limited value compared with health benefits.
A plan participant diagnosed with an advancing or terminal form of
cancer or one who has tested positive for the AIDS virus is unlikely to
be as interested in a pension as he would be in health care. Mackey,
however, did not involve debtors whose dependence on the plan benefits
would arouse much compassion. The Court had to determine whether
to allow debtors to go on a vacation while those whom they owed were
left uncompensated (or were forced to collect plan money after it was
distributed). Given these options, the end that the Court reached seems
entirely proper. However, the means used to reach that end, a means
which places a burden on all welfare benefit plans, is inartfully done
and goes too far.

D.

A Possible Solution

The problems now presented by Mackey would be most properly
solved by congressional action. Congress should pass a law which
unambiguously preempts state laws that allow garnishment of benefits
in an employee welfare benefit plan. However, if Congress is compelled
to provide a different level of protection to vacation trusts than to pen-

70. Marshall v. Davis, 517 F.Supp. 551 (W.D. Mich. 1981) (vacation and holiday fund
trustees held liable for dilution of plan assets for economic loss which was borne equally by participants who had acquiesced and those who had not acquiesced to a transaction).
71. Arizona Laborers, Teamsters, and Cement Masons, Local 395 Pension Trust Fund v.
Nevarez ("ALTCM"), 661 F. Supp 365, 370 (D. Ariz. 1987)(quoting Franchise Tax Board of
California v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust for Southern California ("FTB !"), 679 F.2d
1307,1311 (1982)(Tang, J., dissenting)).
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sion plans, a preference expressed by some judges, 72 it could make a
distinction between what could be termed "vital" and "non-vital" welfare benefits. 73 Any aversion to shielding vacation funds from garnishment can be satisfied by removing the preemption protection of section
514(a) from "non-vital" welfare benefit plans (or not extending such
protection to them) and by reaffirming or extending the preemption
protection to cover "vital" welfare benefit plans.

IV.

CoNCLUSION

Although Mackey reaffirmed the power of federal preemption of
statutes which specifically "refer to" ERISA, it retreated from the
broad scope of federal preemption of state laws which "relate to"
ERISA. This retreat will further burden employee welfare benefit
plans with additional administrative requirements and will provide
preferential treatment for pension plans compared with plans which
provide equally vital welfare benefits. In reaching this decision, the
Court expanded its ability to choose which congressional intent to consider in reaching its desired result. Congressional action will be required to put both types of plans and the interests which they protect
on a level playing field, or the Court will need to exercise some selfrestraint and take less liberty with important statutory protection.

Richard F. Armknecht III

72. FTB I, 679 F.2d at 1311 (Tang, J. dissenting); ALTCM, 661 F. Supp at 370.
73. Vital welfare benefits should be those which are provided to the poor through federal
entitlement programs and would include health and education benefits. Non-vital benefits would,
therefore, encompass those benefits not provided through entitlement programs such as vacation
benefits. Further guidance may be available from the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1671-77 (1982), which "Congress enacted ... for the purpose of limiting the total amount of
wages which could be garnished [and] permitted garnishment of vacation pay to the same extent as
other wages." Brief of Amicus Curiae in Support of the Judgment Below at 6, Markey v. Lanier
Collections Agency & Service, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 2182 (1988).

